The present study addresses the question of how taxpayers' perceptions of government and tax authorities are influenced by media coverage. The effect that national political topics, such as tax legislation and the expenditure of tax revenues, have on the tax payer is examined. Tax compliance depends on trust in authorities, i.e., a commonly shared belief that politicians and tax authorities act in order to promote social welfare, and the perceived power of authorities, i.e., taxpayers' perceptions of tax authorities' ability to detect and pursue tax crime. We investigate the influence of specific tax related information in the news on intended tax compliance. Results from a questionnaire-based experiment with 487 employees indicate that media coverage influences the indicated trust in tax authorities, as well as the perceived power of governmental institutions, and consequently, has an impact on participants' intended tax compliance. The findings suggest that governments should actively engage in the provision of relevant information on tax matters. This would increase both trust in the state and the authorities as well as awareness of their power regarding the enforcement of tax laws, effectively acting as a means to regulate taxpayers' behavior.
crucial role in the development of the concept of enhanced relationship.
Trust is said to be influenced by perceptions of transparency and the legitimacy of political processes (Feld & Frey, 2007) , and apparently related to tax morale (Torgler, 2003) .
Tax morale explains honest taxpaying by the conviction that paying taxes is a civic duty (Orviska & Hudson, 2002) . Other scholars highlight the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes as subject to tax morale (Alm & Torgler, 2006; Feld & Frey, 2002) . The promotion of tax morale is desirable from a practical perspective, since it fosters the reduction of compliance costs (Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, & Torgler, 2009 , Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2010 ).
However, beliefs are difficult to influence and hard to change, so they might not directly correspond to manipulations of trust and power perceptions. In contrast, intended tax compliance is related more closely to actual behavior. It expresses taxpayers' intentions to comply with the law and to pay taxes honestly. Since we are not able to address real taxpaying behavior within the present experimental setting, we put emphasize on the intentions to comply. Thus, we assume that intended tax compliance might be influenced to a greater extent by media coverage on tax issues than general tax morale.
Overall, empirical evidence supports the assumptions of the slippery slope framework.
Both dimensions trust and power have shown to be relevant determinants of tax compliance (Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pantya, Belianin, & Kirchler, 2013; Lisi, 2012; Muehlbacher, Kirchler, & Schwarzenberger, 2011; Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010) . Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge no experiment has applied these findings to real-life situations, in 5 which trust, perceptions of power, and their impact on tax compliance as a function of the provision of tax related information are examined. We investigate whether it is possible to draw citizens' attention towards authorities' power and trust attributes through selected news in the media. Furthermore, we test whether the "priming" through news has an effect on trust and power perceptions and consequently on compliance, even if the overall situation in a country remains unchanged. Hence, the aims of our study are twofold: On the one hand, we investigate the impact of tax-policy-related media coverage on taxpayers' trust in and perceived power of tax authorities. On the other hand, this study addresses determinants of intended tax compliance in a real-life scenario. This is particularly relevant since governments seek ways to extend their tax bases, so as to increase tax compliance. One promising approach might be the promotion of services and transparency in tax matters (Alm, Cherry, Jones, & McKee, 2010) . Hence, media coverage could play a substantial role in the manipulation of taxpayers' perceptions of trust and power, and therefore serve as a measure of future tax policy in order to promote compliance. Accordingly, the following hypotheses will be tested: (1) Exposure to media coverage, presenting Austrian tax authorities as trustworthy, leads to higher trust in the Austrian authorities, than information suggesting Austrian tax authorities to be untrustworthy. (2) Exposure to media coverage presenting Austrian tax authorities as powerful, results in higher perceived power of Austrian authorities, than information implying that Austrian tax authorities are rather powerless. (3) Both, higher indicated trust and higher perceived power will yield a higher level of intended tax compliance.
Method

Participants
A total of 544 employees living in Vienna, Austria, participated in the study. 433 answered the paper-based questionnaire and 111 an online version. Overall 57 were excluded from further analyses due to missing or insufficient data 1 . The final sample consisted of N = 487 participants (50.7% females) with an average age of 33.9 years (SD = 11.3). The majority of participants were Austrian (79.1 %) or German (7.2 %) citizens. Different educational levels were represented relatively equally in the sample (29.0% compulsory education; 36.3% 6 general qualification for university entrance; 34.7% academic education). Average net earnings of the participants were reported to be between € 1.000 and € 2.000 per month.
Material
In contrast to previous experiments, mainly set up in an artificial environment presenting hypothetical scenarios, the present study applied actual facts on Austrian tax policy. It referred to media coverage, official statistics, and reports or opinion polls in order to influence trust in and perceived power of tax authorities. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four different scenarios, in which information about the Austrian state and its tax policy was provided. After reading the introduction participants were asked to complete a questionnaire.
Following an approach used in Wahl et al. (2010) and Kogler et al. (2013) , the introductory texts established four different settings. These paid regard to the characterization of the Austrian tax authorities manipulating the two factors trust in authorities (high vs. low) and power of authorities (high vs. low; for details see Appendix A) in a 2 x 2 design. The different trust and power scenarios were combined to obtain four experimental conditions: (1) high trust and high power, (2) high trust and low power, (3) low trust and high power, and (4) low trust and low power. Due to the fact that tax policy is discussed controversially and objective information is hardly accessible, it was possible to generate positive as well as negative scenarios. These were based on media reports for both trust and power. Furthermore, previous research reports levels of trust and power among taxpayers in Austria to be at a medium level (Kogler et al., 2013) . Thus, both positive and negative facts on Austrian tax policy might be perceived as plausible in general.
In the high trust scenario, the political situation in Austria was described as very stable. This was based on selectively chosen information that was published in the media; legislation was characterized as highly transparent and authorities as very trustworthy, service-oriented and supportive, spending tax revenues efficiently and transparently. However in the low trust condition, information was emphasized describing Austria as a country with relatively low political stability (referring to the number of premature government terminations), lacking legal transparency, with little service oriented authorities spending tax revenues inefficiently. Furthermore, the high power scenario provided information published in the media which characterized the Austrian tax authorities as very efficient, pursuing and punishing tax evasion effectively and severely. Finally, the low power condition made use of 7 facts and figures that presented tax authorities as highly ineffective regarding prosecution and punishment of tax evasion.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and subsequently answered a questionnaire by completing a Likert-type scale ranging from (1) strong disagreement to (9) strong agreement for each single item (see Appendix B). The scale to measure trust in authorities consisted of two items (e.g., "The governmental authorities in Austria act fair and on behalf of their citizens"; Cronbach's α = .75). The perceived power scale included three items (e.g., "Chances that tax evasion will be detected in Austria are high"; Cronbach's α = .81). Intended tax compliance was assessed by three items (e.g. "How likely would you pay your tax completely honest?"; Cronbach's α = .76), which were selected considering previous findings (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010; Wahl et al., 2010) . A factor analysis confirmed the assumption of one underlying factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.01, and factor loadings ranging from .63 to .90. Furthermore, participants were asked to rate how closely the given information related to their personal perception of tax policy in Austria to measure the perceived similarity. This item is considered to be of particular importance. It indicated how susceptible participants were regarding the trust and power manipulations. A low score on this item would indicate that the information presented contradicted participants' perceptions of the real situation in Austria.
Finally, demographic data (i.e., gender, age, nationality, level of education, income)
were collected.
Procedure
Data collection was arranged between January and March 2012. The paper-based questionnaire was distributed among employed people in Vienna. In addition, a link to an online version of the questionnaire was spread via social media. Completion of the questionnaire (including reading the respective scenario) required about 20 minutes.
Participation was completely voluntary and no financial incentives were provided. 8
Results
Trust and Perceived Power
To investigate if the manipulation of information regarding tax policy in Austria affected indicated trust in and perceived power of the authorities, a two-way MANCOVA was calculated with trust and power as independent factors, scales of trust and perceived power as dependent variables, and gender, age, education, and income as covariates. Estimated means and standard errors of the scales for trust and power are depicted in Table 1 . Multivariate results revealed significant main effects of both trust (F(2, 457) = 6.55, p < .01, η² = .03) and power (F(2, 457) = 30.59, p < .001, η² = .12), but no significant interaction effect (F(2, 457) = 2.27, p = .11, η² = .01). Univariate results showed that participants in the high trust conditions indicated more trust in Austria's authorities than participants in the low trust conditions (F(1, 458) = 12.95, p < .001, η² = .03; high trust: Furthermore, the level of education significantly influenced participants' perceptions of trust (F(1, 458) = 21.66, p < .001, η² = .05). Participants with lower education reported lower trust in authorities compared to higher educated participants. In a nutshell, the manipulation was successful in influencing participants' trust and perceptions of power.
Beyond that, the manipulation of power affected the reported level of trust.
Tax Compliance
In order to identify participant's tax compliance intentions, a two-way ANCOVA with the independent factors trust and power, the dependent variable intended tax compliance, and the covariates gender, age, education, and income was conducted. Results are presented in Table 2 . Results show a significant main effect of trust (F(1, 458) = 4.59, p < .05, η² = .01), a significant main effect of power (F(1, 458) = 7.64, p < .01, η² = .02) and no significant interaction effect (F(1, 458) = 0.45, p = .50, η² = .01). Participants reported higher intended tax compliance in the high trust conditions (Estimated mean = 6.35, SE = .13) compared to the low trust conditions (Estimated mean = 5.94, SE = .14), and in the high power conditions (Estimated mean = 6.41, SE = .14) compared to the low power conditions (Estimated mean = 5.88, SE = .13). Highest intended tax compliance was observed in the high trust and high power conditions (Estimated mean = 6.67, SE = .19).
Furthermore, the covariate age (F(1, 458) = 8.85, p < .01, η² = .02) significantly influenced reported intended tax compliance: older participants reported higher intended tax compliance. With regard to the covariate gender no significant difference was observed (F(1, 458) = 1.91, p = .17, η² = .01).
Perceived Similarity
In order to evaluate the scenarios with respect to participants' perceptions of similarity to the actual situation in Austria, a two-way ANCOVA was calculated with the independent factors trust and power, perceived similarity as dependent variable, and the covariates gender, age, education, and income. Results revealed a significant main effect of trust .003). Although people showed a tendency to find the low trust conditions more realistic than the high trust conditions, the results clearly revealed that the mean similarity indicated was between 5 and 6 in all four conditions, i.e., above the scale mean of 5. Thus, our manipulation has worked, the information presented was perceived as reasonably realistic in all scenarios.
Discussion
This paper addressed the questions of how taxpayers' perceptions of the government and tax authorities, as well as their intentions to comply, are influenced by media coverage on tax policy-related topics. The results suggest that media coverage dealing with tax matters, does indeed have the potential to impact people's trust in the governmental authorities, as well as their perceptions of those authorities' power. Furthermore, media coverage seems to have an impact on citizens' intentions to pay their taxes honestly. The results of the present research are considerably remarkable. The manipulation was not as powerful as in comparable experiments, given that it had to be based on isolated facts highlighted in the media, and not on an overall situation in the country or artificially generated scenarios.
Accordingly, especially information regarding abilities to detect and punish tax crimes seems to have a strong impact. Since such information has shown not only to affect perceived levels of governmental power but also evaluations of trustworthiness. On the other hand, information regarding the transparency of the tax system, service orientation of tax authorities and the reputation of the government seems to positively influence trust in the state and its 11 representatives. Moreover, the results of this study indicate that it is not only trust and perceptions of power that are affected by media coverage, but also intentions to comply.
These findings are in line with the assumptions of the slippery slope framework. They highlight both trust and power as necessary in establishing a high level of tax compliance. As expected, the highest intended compliance rates were observed in the high trust and high power conditions, whereas low extents of trust and power reduced intended tax compliance. A major contribution of this article is, in contrast to previous studies based on fictitious scenarios, the confirmation of a link between actual media coverage on tax matters and the intention to pay taxes honestly.
Regarding the covariates considered in our model, the findings support prior results.
These report higher tax compliance of older taxpayers (e.g., Kirchler, 2007; Feinstein, 1991; Tittle, 1980) . In contrast to some previous studies (e.g., Brooks & Doob, 1990; Collins, Milliron, & Toy, 1992) , women did not show higher intentions to comply. Another factor, of great relevance with respect to tax policy, is tax related education. In our sample, the level of education showed to be correlated with trust in the governmental authorities. It might therefore be rewarding to invest in public education regarding tax policy and the tax system, in order to increase compliance. This idea is supported by findings that suggest a negative relationship between the complexity of tax systems and the willingness or ability to comply (e.g., Cuccia & Carnes, 2001; Collins et al., 1992) .
Nevertheless, there are some limitations: The majority of participants were employed taxpayers, who have few possibilities to avoid or evade taxes. Therefore, most participants could not rely on personal experiences when answering the presented questions. Furthermore, this study is based on intentions to behave compliantly and does not address actual taxpaying behavior. Although critical evidence questioning the predictive value of self-reports with regard to actual tax behavior can be found in the literature (e.g., Hessing, Elffers, & Weigel, 1988) , there is also evidence suggesting a positive relationship between data obtained from self-reports and compliance observed by tax authorities (Hite, 1988) . Research also confirms a congruency between intended compliance in scenario-tasks and behavior in incentivized experiments in the laboratory (Wahl et al., 2010) .
The manipulation of tax related attitudes in a real setting is complex. This is due to individual perceptions of the tax system being subject to a whole variety of different factors.
These may not wholly be captured in an experimental setting. Besides trust, perceptions of transparency, rights of co-determination, possible consequences of noncompliant behavior, and personal experiences are likely to influence tax compliance. These pre-existing opinions towards paying taxes might complement the experimental manipulation, but as it turned out, they do not seem to overlay in the experimental setting. Despite personal habits and attitudes towards taxpaying (i.e. "tax morale"), this study points out the significance of media coverage on tax matters with regard to behavioral intentions on an individual level. Influencing citizens' perceptions of tax matters via media reports may thus be an effective means to increase tax revenues and should be considered more strongly in policy design.
Our findings link theoretical research on tax compliance with actual tax policy and the design of communication strategies. Therefore this study adds to the discussion about which factors influence tax compliance. It shows that tax related media coverage does not only influence trust in and perceived power of tax authorities, but also has an impact on intended tax compliance. The results indicate, in line with the assumptions of the slippery slope framework, that tax compliance is a function of trust and power, which may be leveraged by the use of media coverage. It might therefore be a promising approach to promote education and transparency in tax policy by the use of media coverage in order to increase tax compliance.
Legislation in Austria is transparent. The government offers free information and consulting
with regard to legal and tax related issues. For instance, "help.gv.at", an How closely does the given information about Austria relate to your personal perception?
Trust
The governmental authorities in Austria act fair and on behalf of their citizens.
The governmental authorities in Austria use tax revenues reasonably and conscientiously.
Perceived Power
Chances that tax evasion will be detected in Austria are high.
The detection of tax evasion in Austria will lead to severe punishments.
The governmental institutions in Austria are very effective in the suppression of tax criminality.
Intended Tax Compliance
You are self-employed and your business is going well. Your tax return is due and you have to pay taxes.
How likely would you pay your tax completely honest?
A customer paid in cash and did not require an invoice. You could intentionally omit this income on your income tax return. How likely is it that you would omit this income?
You bought some of your goods privately. You could resell those goods later to established customers and omit the profit from this sale on your income tax return. How likely would you omit the profit from this sale on your income tax return?
